The short-run macroeconomic impact of foreign aid to small states: An agnostic time series analysis by Hansen, Henrik & Headey, Derek
 
IFPRI Discussion Paper 00863 
May 2009 
The Short-Run Macroeconomic Impact of  
Foreign Aid to Small States 
An Agnostic Time Series Analysis  
Henrik Hansen 
Derek Headey 
Development Strategy and Governance Division  
INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) was established in 1975. IFPRI is one of 15 
agricultural research centers that receive principal funding from governments, private foundations, and 
international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTORS AND PARTNERS 
IFPRI’s research, capacity strengthening, and communications work is made possible by its financial 
contributors and partners. IFPRI receives its principal funding from governments, private foundations, 
and international and regional organizations, most of which are members of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). IFPRI gratefully acknowledges the generous unrestricted 
funding from Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and World 
Bank. 
AUTHORS 
Henrik Hansen, University of Copenhagen 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics  
Email: Henrik.Hansen@foi.dk 
 
Derek Headey, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Postdoctoral Fellow, Development Strategy and Governance Division 
Email: d.headey@cgiar.org 
Notices 
1 Effective January 2007, the Discussion Paper series within each division and the Director General’s Office of IFPRI 
were merged into one IFPRI–wide Discussion Paper series. The new series begins with number 00689, reflecting the 
prior publication of 688 discussion papers within the dispersed series. The earlier series are available on IFPRI’s 
website at www.ifpri.org/pubs/otherpubs.htm#dp. 
2 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results, and have been peer reviewed by at 
least two reviewers—internal and/or external. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical 
comment. 
Copyright 2009 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this document may be reproduced for 
noncommercial and not-for-profit purposes without the express written permission of, but with acknowledgment to, the International 





1.  Introduction  1 
2.  A Simple Accounting Framework for Aid Flows  3 
3. A Simple Econometric Model of Absorption, Spending and Production  7 
4. The Data  11 
5. Empirical Results  15 
6. Conclusion  17 
References  19  
iv 
 
List of Tables 
1.   The sample of small developing countries  11 
2.   Summary statistics for the sample of small developing countries, 1972-2003  11 
3.   Means and standard deviations for the variables in the VAR models, 1972-2003  12 
4.   Dynamic responses to an aid shock: Average aid flow, absorption, spending, and production for  
  the 13 aid-dependent countries  15 
5.  Dynamic responses to an aid shock: Average aid flow, absorption, spending, and production for  
the seven non-aid-dependent countries  16 
 
List of Figures 
1.   Changes in aid, net imports and domestic demand (% GDP in 1973) in 13 aid-dependent SDCs  13 
2.   Changes in aid, net imports and domestic demand (% GDP in 1973) in seven non-aid-dependent  






We herein investigate the short-run macroeconomic impact of aid in small developing countries (SDCs) 
by using a vector auto regression (VAR) model to study the impact of aid on net import (absorption) and 
domestic demand (spending). We focus on average country effects within two country sub-groups, and 
find substantial differences between ‘aid-dependent’ SDCs and other SDCs that are more dependent on 
natural resources, tourism or financial services. In aid-dependent SDCs, aid absorption more or less 
equals spending, although only half of the aid flow is absorbed and spent. In the non-aid-dependent 
group, aid does not seem to be absorbed or spent in any systematic fashion.  





1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although many aspects of small developing countries (SDCs) have been widely researched in the 
development literature, especially their structural differences compared to larger developing countries,
1 
relatively little is known about the effectiveness of aid in SDCs.
2 This is surprising given that one of the 
most distinctive features of SDCs is their high degree of dependence on foreign aid. On average, small 
states tend to receive two to three times as much aid (relative to GDP) as large states, raising real 
concerns about the implications for both long-run institutional development and short-run macroeconomic 
management. A key objective of the present study is to expand our knowledge of this second area of 
concern, namely the impact of aid to SDCs on short-run macroeconomic management.  
Aid can be highly fungible, and donors wish to know that their money is really being spent. 
However, donors and recipients alike also want to be sure that large aid inflows do not indirectly cause 
macroeconomic problems that could limit the overall impact of foreign aid on growth and development. 
Of special concern in small open economies (i.e. those that depend heavily on the ability of strong export 
sectors to generate enough exchange to satisfy import demand) is the possibility that aid flows 
denominated in foreign currencies may raise either nominal exchange rates or the prices of other critical 
resources that are in limited domestic supply (e.g. skilled workers or coastal land). These effects, known 
as Dutch Disease, are often considered one of the main reasons for the apparent ineffectiveness of aid.3 
The textbook method for avoiding Dutch Disease is to ‘absorb’ aid inflows through increased imports. An 
alternative solution (although one that may be less attractive to donors) is for aid recipients to delay 
absorption and aid spending by bolstering their foreign exchange reserves. 
With our focus on the short-run macroeconomic impacts of aid, the present study is related to 
several recent studies evaluating foreign aid through a variety of empirical approaches and techniques. 
For example, the fiscal response literature uses theoretically-motivated models to simulate the effect of 
aid on government expenditure, tax revenue and other policies, given the utility preferences of 
policymakers (see, for example, McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004). Other studies examine the volatility 
of aid flows, and consider implications for the appropriate utilization of aid by recipients (Pallage and 
Robe, 2001; Bulíř and Hamann, 2003, 2008). Other recent reports use overtly historical analyses that 
combine narrative and empirical elements from small sets of countries to examine the absorption and 
spending decisions of aid recipients, where absorption is defined as increases in the current account 
deficit (net of aid), and spending as increases in the government fiscal deficit net of aid (IMF 2005; Aiyar 
et al. 2006; Berg et al. 2007; Foster and Killick 2006; Killick and Foster 2007).4 Although this research is 
still in its infancy, it offers some interesting insights into how recipients might respond to a significant up-
scaling of aid, as mandated by the Gleneagles summit of 2004. At the time of this report, only one study, 
that of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008), provides an econometric analysis of absorption and spending in a 
cross-section of countries. The findings of Aiyar and Ruthbah generally support the case studies in Berg 
et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006), in that these authors consistently find quite low spending 
ratios and even smaller absorption ratios. 
Our approach is methodologically similar to recent studies using more atheoretical or agnostic 
approaches to gauge the effects of aid on the macroeconomy. These studies use vector autoregressive 
                                                      
1 A number of recent papers have systematically tested for differences between small and large states. See, among others, 
Streeten (1993), Bertram (1993), Milner and Westaway (1993), Briguglio (1995), Armstrong et al. (1998), Easterly and Kraay 
(2000), Armstrong and Read (2002), and Kose and Prasad (2002).  
2 In particular, there are very few cross-country studies, especially of the econometric kind, on aid effectiveness in SDCs. 
See Feeny (2007) for a recent example. However, country studies have been reported in numbers too large to allow them to be 
adequately referenced herein. 
3 See Adam (2006) for a survey and discussion of Dutch Disease effects of aid flows. 
4 The studies by IMF (2005), Aiyar et al. (2006) and Berg et al. (2007) are closely related and (more or less) written by the 
same group of authors. Although IMF (2005) was the first, we hereinafter refer to Berg et al. (2007), as it is the most 
comprehensive study.  
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(VAR) models to estimate the impact of aid receipt on fiscal policy in individual countries [e.g. the report 
of Osei, et al. (2005) on this issue in Ghana].  
While related to all these branches of the macroeconomic literature, our study is methodologically 
distinct in that we also use the agnostic VAR approach, but we focus our attention on a range of countries 
rather than a single country. Furthermore, although we examine the macroeconomic utilization of aid in 
the short run, as is done in the more narrative reports by Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006), 
we expand on the prior studies by examining both spending and absorption responses using more 
systematic econometric techniques. 
Generally speaking, it could be problematic to use a VAR approach to gauge short-run aid 
impacts across a wide range of countries, given the variety of legitimate uses to which aid can be put in 
the short run. This variety is amply demonstrated in even the small number of countries analyzed in the 
studies of Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006). Moreover, heterogeneity in the quality of 
domestic policy could also confound our analysis, given that poor policy environments can add an 
additional spanner into the workings of aid in the macroeconomy. However, we herein focus on 20 small 
developing countries, using a strategy that has two advantages with regard to the above concerns. First, 
we are effectively studying the short-run effects of aid in economies that are, in many cases, ‘supra-open’ 
in terms of trade policies and trade to GDP ratios. Second, small economies (especially small island 
economies) are typically thought to have somewhat better policies and institutions compared to other 
developing countries.5 Thus, our focus on SDCs allows us to investigate the extent to which aid is 
absorbed and spent in a group of highly aid-dependent economies that satisfy the implicit assumptions of 
a textbook prescription for how aid ought to be used, in that they have relatively good policies and 
institutions, and are characterized by very high degrees of openness. So although we do not wish to over-
emphasize the relevance of our results to issues such as the impacts of doubling aid to African countries, 
our results are indirectly relevant in the sense that if aid-dependent SDCs do not absorb and spend aid in a 
textbook fashion, we would tend to doubt that textbook absorption and spending would be seen in larger 
and less open economies. 
In summary, this study has three major objectives. The first objective is to improve our 
knowledge of aid usage in a group of countries that are highly aid-dependent and where there are strong 
concerns about the indirect impacts of aid on the macroeconomy. A second objective is to develop and 
test a new econometric tool for testing macroeconomic questions that have previously relied in large part 
on case study analysis, often of a narrative nature. The third and final objective is to examine whether 
countries that possess broadly textbook characteristics do, indeed, absorb and spend aid inflows in a 
manner that does not disturb the short-run macroeconomic balances.  
Accordingly, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical underpinnings 
of aid’s short-run effects on the macroeconomy in terms of absorption and spending, and discusses the 
diverse responses observed in the Berg et al. and Foster and Killick studies. Section 3 describes our 
econometric modeling techniques in detail. Section 4 presents our data set. Section 5 discusses our 
empirical results. Section 6 provides some brief concluding remarks and directions for future research. 
 
 
                                                      
5 The reasons for the relatively good socioeconomic performance of SDCs are typically thought to be two-fold. First, SDCs 
have an apparent disadvantage that could work to their advantage in the long run, namely an extreme dependence upon the world 
economy, which is thought to impose the discipline of competition on domestic markets, and to pressure policymakers into 
adopting internationally acceptable policies and institutional structures. Second, their lack of political and economic importance 
on the international stage could mean that larger countries do not view them as economically threatening, and may even see 
‘rewarding’ SDC support as a cost-effective means of acquiring support in UN voting decisions (Bertram 1993). Thus, powerful 
countries may be inclined to offer SDCs more favorable conditions on trade, offshore finance laws, migration, and foreign aid, 
relative to other LDCs.  
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2.  A SIMPLE ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK FOR AID FLOWS 
In this section, we discuss possible scenarios for the macroeconomic use of aid flows. In line with Berg et 
al. (2007), we do not formulate a fully-fledged theoretical model, but rather adopt an accounting approach 
by using balance-of-payments and the national accounts system as an organizing framework. The main 
purpose of this discussion is to identify channels by which increases in aid inflows could affect 
macroeconomic aggregates. In contrast to the analyses in Berg et al. (2007), we herein focus on economy-
wide aggregates rather than on government decisions and the interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policy. 
Aid Flows in the Balance-of-Payments Accounts 
Most foreign aid is transferred to an economy in the form of a grant or loan to the recipient country 
government.
6 In the balance-of-payments system, aid grants are recorded as current transfers on the 
current account, while loans are recorded as changes in the net financial position of the capital account 
(vis-à-vis the rest of the world). Hence, we can specify the following balance-of-payments identities:  
  11 () ( ) ,
g
tt t t t t t t t CA X M W i L rD A      (1) 
  () .
ol r
tt t t KALA A     (2) 
In equation 1, the current account (CA)   is defined as the net export of goods and services 
(export, X, less import, M) plus net private transfers (W, mainly remittances and worker compensation) 
less net interest payments to foreigners (iL + rD), with interest payments on market loans (iL) separated 
from interest payments on concessional aid loans (rD). The final term in the capital accounts definition 
(1) is that of aid grants (A
g). In equation 2, the capital account (KA) is specified simply as the net change 
in non-aid foreign debt (￿L
o), which has both private and public elements, plus the foreign aid loan given 
within the year (A
l), less repayments of principal on the aid loans (amortizations).
7 
Using the fact that the difference between the current account and the capital account equals the 
change in foreign reserves (￿R), we have the following decomposition of the overall balance-of-
payments: 
  11 () ( ) .
g lr o
tt t t ttt tt t t t A AA R MX i L r D W L            (3) 
From this identity it is clear that from a purely accounting perspective, an increase in the net aid 
inflow (through either a grant or loan) can ‘enter the economy’ in five ways. The inflow may:  
  Increase foreign reserves  
  Increase net imports of goods and services 
  Finance interest payments on foreign debt (both aid and non-aid debt) 
  Finance a decrease in private transfers 
  Decrease net external debt (or increase capital flight) 
Put simply, aid inflows may be thought of as initially increasing foreign reserves, because many 
large donations are transferred to dollar accounts in the central banks of recipient countries. Thereafter, it 
is up to the recipient country government and central bank to channel the aid resource into the economy. 
                                                      
6 Both grants and loans may be ‘in kind’ but this does not influence the following discussion. 
7 The sum of the aid grant and the aid loan less the repayment corresponds to the definition of net official development aid 





As we will discuss below, there is unlikely to be any optimal way of ‘distributing’ the aid inflow 
across the balance of payments (BoP) components, as aid increases are often granted and disbursed under 
a variety of different circumstances (e.g. macroeconomic crises). For the moment, we wish to analyze the 
impact of aid inflows under ‘normal’ circumstances, so we focus on the most common intended use of aid 
inflows: to fund an increase in net imports. Therefore, we define the rate of absorption of an increase in 
aid as the increase in net imports relative to the increase in aid. Letting ￿ denote change over time, 













   (4) 
Thus, absorption can be seen as a measure of the direct, real resource transfer associated with an 
increase in the aid inflow.
8 As discussed in Berg et al. (2007), absorption is largely controlled by the 
central bank through its decisions on reserve accumulation and interest rate policy, to the extent that 
interest rates influence the demand for private sector imports via aggregate demand. Some important 
exceptions to the central bank control of aid flows are seen in aid-in-kind, aid given directly to the 
government for purchase of imported goods and services, aid given directly to NGOs, and grants for debt 
forgiveness. Aid is fully absorbed in the first three cases, while there is no absorption in the case of debt 
forgiveness. In most countries, these exceptions are quite small in magnitude, leaving the central bank 
controlling most of the decisions surrounding the absorbance of an increase in aid flow. 
Aid Flows in the National Accounts System 
In terms of national account identities, aid loans do not appear directly, while aid grants are part of 





() ( ) ( ) .
g
tt tt t t t t
g
tt t t t t t t t t t
disp GNI Y W i L rD A
CIG MX W i L r D A


   
      (5) 
The notation in equation 5 follows standard nomenclature: Y is GDP, C is household consumption 
expenditure, I is investment, and G is government consumption. In the second line of equation 5, GDP is 
specified as domestic demand (C + I + G) less net imports (M - X). 
It can be discerned from the above equations that GDP less net interest payments on foreign debt 
plus workers’ compensation from abroad defines GNI, while adding remittances and aid grants yields 
disposable GNI. Hence, foreign aid has no direct impact on the main macroeconomic aggregates 
constituting GDP and GNI. An aid grant that is not used to finance net imports will increase national 
financial savings, but may not alter GDP and/or GNI (in the short run) if the grant is used to either 
increase reserves or decrease foreign debt.
9 Aid only affects the components of GDP when the recipient 
government spends the inflow.
10 Berg et al. (2007), in their definition of aid spending, look at changes in 
government fiscal deficit (net of aid) relative to changes in aid inflow. While this definition clearly relates 
the spending decision to government policies, we prefer the notion of spending aid to have a definition 
more closely linked to the macroeconomy. We therefore use a broader definition of spending, by looking 
at the change in total domestic demand relative to the change in aid: 
                                                      
8 Our definition of absorption differs from the definition in Berg et al. (2007), as we include only net imports of goods and 
services, while they also include net interest payments and private transfers (the non-aid current account). As will be apparent 
later, we consider the former a more natural choice in our setting.  
9 Naturally, over time, there may be second-order effects from an increased reserve position or decreases in interest and 
principal payments on debt. 
10 When aid is given to an NGO, the spending decision is recorded as an increase in household consumption and private 














   (6) 
Under this definition, a government decision not to widen the fiscal deficit could still result in 
increased spending if the private sector increases consumption or investment. 
Absorption, spending and production 
The main reason for the above definitions of absorption and spending is that they work directly on the 
national accounts identity by linking spending and absorption decisions to changes in GDP relative to the 
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Based on this identity, we can discuss different short-run responses as combinations of the 
spending and absorption of increased aid inflows.  
With regard to spending, an increased aid transfer to the government can be utilized in four ways. 
The response generally preferred by bilateral donors is what Berg et al. (2007) term the ‘textbook case,’ 
i.e. full absorption and spending that leaves GDP unaffected (in the short run) because the increased 
domestic demand is exactly offset by increased net imports. In the long run, it is hoped that the inflow 
results in increased productive capacity via investments in physical and human capital, and possibly even 
in improved institutions (financed by government consumption or investment in the short run). But 
although this is the textbook response to aid inflow, a variety of circumstances could warrant different 
utilization of aid inflows. 
For example, a second response would be to let the inflow be absorbed but not spent. This may 
occur when the foreign exchange generated by aid flow is used to sterilize the monetary impact of a fiscal 
deficit, leading to increases in the exchange rate and net imports (absorption). If government consumption 
and investment decreases, then spending will be less than absorption, and a visible real resource transfer 
will have a negative short-run impact on growth. Thus, the decision not to spend the inflow may be 
reasonable in times of fiscal stress, but it is not a sustainable development strategy. 
A third response would be to spend but not absorb the inflow. Such an expansion would be 
similar to an increase in domestic demand without any increase in aid inflow, and would result in a 
considerable short-run pressure on GDP, which also may not be sustainable. Both Berg et al. (2007) and 
Foster and Killick (2006) discuss the spending/no-absorption combination in detail, generally noting that 
this is a highly unattractive policy option because it is analogous to deficit financing of public 
expenditure.  
Finally, a fourth option is to neither absorb nor spend the inflow. One way this could be done is 
via principal payment on external debt. In some situations, aid has been disbursed to avoid countries’ 
defaulting on their external debt obligations (so-called defensive lending); under such circumstances, the 
increased inflow is obviously meant to finance interest payments (and possibly principal repayment) on 
external debt.
11 In recent years, grants for debt forgiveness (which are clearly intended to decrease the net 
external debt) have been very popular among a number of bilateral donors, and this strategy has been an 
integral part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.  
A second and very important rationale for neither absorbing nor spending aid is to bolster foreign 
exchange reserves, as often advocated by the IMF in times of balance-of-payment crises (see IMF 2004). 
In small countries that are highly dependent on volatile and unpredictable export revenues and aid flows, 
                                                      
11 Needless to say, ‘defensive lending’ is never stated explicitly as an aid program. However, fairly strong evidence suggests 
the occurrence of defensive lending to highly indebted poor African countries (Birdsall et al. 2003).  
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smoothing out the inflow of foreign reserves and ensuring a relatively large stock of reserves may be a 
sound practice at any time (indeed, a common measure of reserve status is ‘months of imports,’ implying 
that highly import-dependent SDCs ought to maintain larger-than-average reserves). Conversely, this 
means that full absorption and spending of aid within any given year may be a bad choice when fiscal and 
macroeconomic stability is an issue. Hence, when aid flows are volatile and have unpredictable elements, 
full absorption and spending should only be achieved over time, not within a single year.  
This idea of dynamic absorption and spending is implicit in the country studies in Berg et al. 
(2007) and Foster and Killick (2006), since aid absorption and spending is measured over two- to four-
year periods. However, while full absorption and spending is the best short-run response, it is not the 
desired medium-term result if one expects well managed aid flows to increase national income over the 
medium and long runs through investment in physical capital, human capital, and institutional capacity 
building. If aid has a medium-term impact on productivity, then spending should be greater than one and 
should ultimately exceed absorption, which should be less than one, reflecting an increase in exports. This 
may be one reason why the country studies in Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006) often find 
that spending exceeds absorption. 
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3. A SIMPLE ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF ABSORPTION,  
SPENDING AND PRODUCTION 
The above discussion illustrates the need for dynamic models for the econometric analysis of absorption 
and spending, because the optimal time horizon for measuring absorption and spending cannot be given a 
priori. The econometric model of absorption, spending and production developed herein accommodates 
the complications arising in such a dynamic context. 
The Econometric Model 
We herein formulate and apply a simple dynamic econometric model that seeks to account for a country’s 
absorption, spending and changes to GDP following a sudden increase in foreign aid.
12 We use a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model because it does not impose too much a priori structure. Our starting point for 
the econometric model is the national income accounts identity, measured in constant local currency units 
and given as annual changes: 
 




      
 
 (8) 
where Yjt is GDP in country j at time t, Cjt is household consumption, Ijt is gross capital formation 
(investment), Gjt is government consumption, Xjt is exports of goods and services, and Mjt is imports of 
goods and services. As in Section 2, we can specify the changes in GDP (Yjt) as the change in domestic 
demand (Djt) less the change in net imports (NMjt), thereby directly linking our definitions of absorption 
and spending. 
In order to obtain ‘standardized’ measures across countries, we divide the changes in GDP and its 
components by GDP in the initial year. Hence, we look at the change in real GDP from year t-1 to year t, 
relative to the initial level and the contributions from the terms on the right-hand side of the identity: 
  () jtj t j t j t yd mx  
 (9) 
where each of the series have been transformed by  
  0
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For foreign aid, we look at the net inflows of aid (grants plus loans minus principal repayments) 
less emergency aid and technical cooperation. The aid inflow is measured analogously to the national 
income accounts variables in equation 9; i.e. we model the change in aid inflows (A) in country j from t-1 












The national income accounts variables in equation 9 and the aid variable in equation 11 are used 
to specify a VAR model. However, because equation 9 is an identity, the covariance matrix of 
disturbances is singular. As shown in Barten (1969), the parameters of the model can be consistently 
estimated by omitting one of the variables from the system. In the present model, it doesn’t matter which 
                                                      
12 By ‘sudden increase,’ we mean an unanticipated exogenous change in aid, or at least a change in aid that is not predictable 
given our model set-up.   
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variable is omitted.
13 We omit imports from the model, meaning that the VAR is specified to include 
scaled changes in aid, real GDP, domestic demand, and exports [i.e., we consider the 4 x 1 vector 
(,,,)   jt j tj tj tj t Z aydx
]. In addition to these four endogenous variables, we control for the impact of 
natural disasters, Fjt, as measured by the number of people per 100 who are affected by natural disasters 
each year.
14 We mainly control for natural disasters because aid flows to a disaster-struck country may 
respond within-year to such exogenous events. 
The resulting VAR model can be formulated as: 
  10
pq
jt j jk jt k jl jt l jt
kl
Z ZF u  

   
 (12) 
where ￿j is a vector of country-specific intercept terms, ￿jk, k = 1,…,p, and ￿jl, l = 0,…,q are country-
specific coefficient matrices, and ujt is a zero-mean innovation process with  ()   jtj t j Euu
 and 
() 0   jt js Euu
 for ts  . 
Identification of Aid Shocks 
The errors in the VAR model (ujt) are reduced form innovations; in order to estimate responses to aid 
shocks, we must identify such aid shocks by transforming the reduced form innovations to structural 
shocks. As the model is based on an accounting identity, there is little guidance from economic theory 
when it comes to specifying the identifying restrictions. Here, we impose a simple identifying structure by 
assuming a causal ordering of the variables. Given the lack of economic theory, we can only give the 
following heuristic argument, using the variable names to indicate the innovations in the respective 
equations:  
  . jtj tj tj t j t axdym 
. (13) 
We assume innovations in aid changes are predetermined, such that the innovations in the aid 
equation are ‘structural’ aid shocks.
15 In light of the importance of the endogeneity and instrumentation of 
aid in cross-country growth regressions, one might ask whether this is a reasonable assumption. To this 
end, it is important to note that we do not assume the exogeneity of aid flows as such. Rather, we assume 
that they are endogenous, but further assume that annual changes in country-specific aid flows—
conditional on lagged changes in aid flows, GDP, domestic demand, exports and imports—are exogenous 
and unpredictable given our information set. In light of the results of the country studies in Berg et al. 
(2007), we believe that this assumption is not unreasonable.  
The ordering within the national accounts identity is mainly governed by the fact that the 
countries in our sample are small open economies. Hence, we assume that shocks to the changes in 
exports (again, conditional on the past) are mainly external events driven by changes in world market 
prices. As most of the countries in the sample have fixed exchange rates, this makes export shocks 
independent of shocks to changes in domestic demand and GDP. The innovation in the change in 
domestic demand is the third variable in the chain, because this variable includes government 
consumption and investment, and discretionary fiscal policy can be considered as consumption or 
investment shocks within the model. Finally, the change in GDP is fourth in the ordering; however, as it 
                                                      
13 See also Greene (2003, Chapter 14) for examples.  
14 The term ‘natural disasters’ covers droughts, earthquakes, epidemics, extreme temperatures, famines, floods, insect 
infestations, landslides, volcano eruptions, wave surges, wild fires, and wind storms. These data are from the International 
Disaster Database (www.em-dat.net) maintained by the Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. 
15 This assumption is the main reason for subtracting emergency aid from the net aid flows, because this kind of aid may 
respond to within-year changes in the macroeconomic variables.  
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precedes changes in imports, the goods market is assumed to be cleared by changes in imports, not by 
changes in GDP.
16 
The VAR model is mainly formulated to analyze the short- and medium-run impact of aid flows. 
Therefore, our specific choice of structural ordering should not be interpreted as an attempt to provide a 
strict identification of structural shocks. Instead, the key assumption is that aid flows are predetermined, 
meaning that the innovations in the aid equation can be interpreted as aid shocks to the economies in 
question. 
Estimation of Absorption, Spending and Production 
The VAR model in equation 12 is specified with country-specific parameters. Thus, in a cross-country 
setting, we must impose some kind of structure on the parameters in order to obtain representative (or 
average) parameter estimates. The simplest and most restrictive structure is to assume that the parameters 
are identical across countries. Under this assumption, the cross-country data can simply be pooled and the 
parameters of the VAR are estimated using ordinary least squares. A slightly less restrictive structure 
allows the intercepts (￿j) to vary across countries, while the slope parameters (￿jk, ￿jk, k=1,…,p) are 
assumed to be equal. This assumption gives us a dynamic panel data model with country-specific fixed 
effects, yielding a structure that is currently popular among cross-country analyses. However, in the 
present setting, where the model is formulated for annual changes of all variables, it may be overly 
restrictive to assume equal slope parameters. Thus, we consider the least restrictive structure, in which we 
allow both the intercepts and the slope parameters to vary across countries. Under this assumption, the 
VAR model in equation 12 is a version of the random coefficient dynamic panel data models in, for 
example, Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Hsiao, Pesaran and Tahmiscioglu (1999).  
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the parameters of the random coefficient dynamic panel data 
model can be consistently estimated using the mean group estimator (MGE), which is computed by 
estimating the parameters for each country using ordinary least squares (OLS) and then taking the 
arithmetic average of the country-specific parameters. For the present analysis, we then use the MGE for 
the autoregressive parameters to estimate the mean group impulse response function parameters for aid, 
GDP, domestic demand and exports. Although imports are omitted, based on the adding-up constraint we 
know that the responses for imports equal the responses in domestic demand plus the responses in exports 
less the responses in GDP. Based on these response parameters, we can estimate responses and 
accumulated responses for all variables of interest. We focus on four functions of the impulse-response 
parameters, namely the estimates of absorption, spending and changes in production following an 
unexpected increase in the aid flow.  
Specifically, if we let Rh(z,a) denote the response in variable z in period t+h following an aid 
shock in period t, then the resulting cumulative change in the aid flows over time can be estimated from 
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Furthermore, absorption up to a given year (s) following the aid shock is the accumulated 
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16 Clearly, this assumption is questionable if lack of foreign exchange reserves is a binding constraint in a country. However, 
we consider the assumption to be reasonable under ‘normal’ circumstances.    
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Spending over time can be estimated analogously as the accumulated response in domestic 
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Finally, the impact on production (GDP) can be estimated as the difference between absorption 
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The four dynamic response functions in equations 14-17 are useful as ‘descriptive’ measures, and 
may also be used to test hypotheses about each of the processes. Some examples of specific testable 
hypotheses are: 
1.  H0: Sudden changes in aid are permanent. 
2.  H0: Absorption of additional aid flows is zero at any given horizon following the initial 
change. 
3.  H0: Spending of additional aid flows is zero at any given horizon following the initial change. 
4.  H0: Absorption equals spending, such that the impact of an additional aid flow on GDP is 
zero at any given horizon following the initial change.  
Despite the mainly descriptive appearance of the VAR approach, these hypotheses are implicitly 
tested in the following section.  
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4. THE DATA 
As noted in the introduction, we herein focus on the short-run impact of aid in small developing countries 
(SDCs). Among the many definitions of SDCs in the literature, most appear to be based on somewhat 
arbitrary criteria, and the definition of the ‘smallness’ of countries appears to have decreased over time. 
Here, we mainly focus on countries with 1980 populations of less than one million, and 1980 per capita 
incomes of less than US$ 5,000 in 1990-adjusted dollars (although the sample does include some higher-
income SDCs). This definition broadly matches the World Bank’s (IDA) criteria for small countries that 
require special assistance due to their size, as well as the commonly-used criteria from the cross-country 
growth regression literature, which typically focuses on ‘large’ countries with populations above one 
million. 
Table 1. The sample of small developing countries 
Cape Verde   French Polynesia  Mauritius*   Seychelles  
Comoros   Gabon*   St. Lucia*  Suriname* 
Djibouti   The Gambia  St. Kitts & Nevis*  Togo  
Dominica  Grenada*   St. Vincent & the Grenadines  Tonga  
Fiji*   Guinea-Bissau   Sao Tome & Principe  Vanuatu  
Note: Countries marked with * comprise the subsample of non-aid-dependent countries. 
Using the above-described guidelines and selecting countries for which we can gather a 
reasonable amount of acceptable-quality data, we construct a sample of 20 countries with annual data for 
the period from 1972 to 2003.17 The sample countries are given in Table 1, while some summary 
statistics for the countries and sub-groups are given in Table 2.  
Table 2. Summary statistics for the sample of small developing countries, 1972-2003 
 All 
(N = 20, Obs. = 577) 
 Aid-dependent 
 (N = 13, Obs. = 374) 
 Non-aid-dependent   
(N = 7, Obs. = 203) 
 Mean  Std.Dev    Mean  Std.Dev   Mean  Std.Dev 
GDP per capita 
(Constant USD)  
2467 3274   2225 3786   2914  1945 
Dom. Dem./GDP  120.6  19.8    127.0  19.1    108.8  15.3 
Net Imports/GDP  20.6  19.8    27.0  19.1    8.8  15.3 
Exports/GDP 41.5 21.8   34.8  22.8   53.7  12.8 
Imports/GDP 62.1 24.8   61.8  27.8   62.5  18.1 
Aid/GDP   10.9  13.6    15.0  15.2    3.2  3.2 
Aid/Trade 13.6  19.3    19.4  21.7    2.8 3.0 
Notes: All ratios are reported as percentages. Trade is the sum of imports and exports. N is the number of countries. Obs. is the 
total number of observations in the sample. 
The countries in our sample are generally quite poor, having an overall average per capita GDP 
just below constant US$ 2,500 (Table 2). Another interesting (yet unsurprising) fact is that these countries 
rely heavily on international trade, with an average trade-to-GDP ratio just above 100 per cent and an 
average net import-to-GDP ratio of about 20 per cent. The aid data in Table 2 conform to our own 
                                                      
17 Data quality is a significant limiting factor, as we require reliable annual observations for all expenditure components in 
the national accounts identity. A frequent problem in the national accounts data is that the real growth rate in one or more of the 
expenditure components is identical to the growth rate in real GDP, i.e. the data are constructed so as to maintain a fixed 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio over time in real terms. The most extreme example of this is seen in Kiribati, where all national income 
account components have identical growth rates from 1971 to 2003. Needless to say, such data do not allow analysis usingour 
approach.  
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definition by including grants and loans minus loan repayments, but excluding emergency aid and 
technical cooperation. Under this definition, we see that the annual aid inflow could finance, on average, 
half of the annual net imports, indicating that most of these small economies largely finance net imports 
through external resources other than aid. 
We use the average aid flow in each country to identify highly aid-dependent economies; in 
contrast to most other studies, however, we look at aid relative to trade (imports plus exports) instead of 
relative to GDP, both because international trade is so important in small developing countries, and 
because aid and trade are alternative means of earning foreign exchange. Somewhat arbitrarily, we define 
countries as aid-dependent if they have an average aid-to-trade ratio above 5 per cent. Under this 
definition, 13 of the 20 countries are aid-dependent. The non-aid-dependent countries are indicated by 
asterisks in Table 1, and the summary statistics in Table 2 clearly show that these seven countries have 
low aid-to-trade ratios because they export relatively more than the 13 aid-dependent countries. In fact, 
while the import shares are almost equal in the two country groups, the average export share is 
significantly lower for the aid-dependent countries (35%) compared to the non-aid-dependent countries 
(54%). The aid-dependent country group is also poorer on average, it has a much higher net import share, 
and the average aid-to-GDP share is significantly higher compared to that of the non-aid-dependent 
country group.
18  
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for the variables in the VAR models, 1972-2003 
 All 
(N = 20, Obs. = 577) 
 Aid  dependent 
 (N = 13, Obs. = 374) 
 Non-Aid  dependent   
(N = 7, Obs. = 203) 
Scaled changes in  Mean Std.Dev    Mean  Std.Dev   Mean Std.Dev 
Aid        0.23  12.90    0.45  15.76    -0.16  4.01 
Exports       2.23  16.51    2.19  17.06    2.29  15.49 
Domestic demand  6.31  18.32    6.68  20.37    5.62  13.77 
GDP         5.49  9.81    5.68  10.15    5.13  9.17 
Net Imports     0.82  16.04    0.99  17.92    0.49  11.85 
Notes: All ratios are reported as percentages. N is the number of countries. Obs. is the total number of observations in the sample. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the data that we use in the VAR model. As in Table 2, 
statistics are shown for all 20 countries, as well as for the aid-dependent and non-aid-dependent country 
groups. The summary statistics indicate a slight increase over time for aid flows to the 20 countries; the 
average change in aid relative to the country-specific level of GDP in 1973 is 0.23 per cent. This increase 
is at least 10-fold less than the increases in real GDP and the demand components. We also find that 
changes in domestic demand outpace GDP, as net imports increase by more than the average increase in 
aid flows over the sample period. The by-group division shows that the seven non-aid-dependent 
countries experience an overall decrease in aid flows over time.
19 Moreover, changes in both GDP and 
exports are larger for non-aid-dependent countries, while the average changes in domestic demand (and 
thus in net imports) are smaller than those in the aid-dependent country group. Finally, the coefficient of 
variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) for the different measures clearly shows substantial 
variation in the data across both time and countries, particularly for aid flows.
20 
Clearly, the dynamic properties of the data cannot be inferred from the tables above. Therefore, 
before turning to our formal econometric results in Section 5, we intuitively examine the properties of the 
                                                      
18 The seven countries with low aid-to-trade shares have special characteristics affecting their international trade volumes. 
For example, four of the countries have significant financial centers (Grenada, Mauritius, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts and Nevis); Fiji 
and Suriname are mineral-rich; and Gabon is an oil/petroleum exporter. 
19 This is on average, and it does not hold for all seven countries. Fiji and Grenada see increasing aid flows over time, while 
the other countries experience decreasing aid flows from 1974 to 2003. Several countries in the aid-dependent group also 
experience decreasing aid flows over time. 
20 This variation is mainly over time; the cross-country variation is less than 10 percent of the total variation in the aid 
variable.  
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time series by graphically examining the time series patterns for key variables. Specifically, in Figures 1 
and 2 we look at the time patterns of aid, net-imports and spending for each country in the sample. Figure 
1 gives plots for the 13 aid-dependent countries, while Figure 2 shows plots for the seven non-aid-
dependent countries. 
Figure 1. Changes in aid, net imports and domestic demand (% GDP in 1973) in 13 aid-dependent 
SDCs 
 
Note: Extreme observations (±40 per cent) are omitted from the plots. Abbreviations: a=aid; d=demand; m-x=net imports. All 




Figure 2. Changes in aid, net imports and domestic demand (% GDP in 1973) in seven non-aid-
dependent SDCs 
 
Note: Extreme observations (±40 per cent) are omitted from the plots. Abbreviations: a=aid; d=demand; m-x=net imports. All 
measures are relative to initial GDP. 
Although we find marked heterogeneity even within the aid-dependent SDCs, the two figures 
highlight some interesting patterns. The first such pattern is seen in the size of aid changes. In most of the 
aid-dependent countries, the changes in aid (scaled by GDP in 1973) are on the same order of magnitude 
as the changes in net imports and domestic demand, whereas the aid flows are much less volatile in the 
non-aid-dependent country group. Second, net imports and spending are likewise more volatile in the aid-
dependent countries. Third, the closeness with which changes in aid track changes in imports or spending 
clearly varies across countries, with the clearest signals seen in the aid-dependent countries. In countries 
such as Dominica, Togo, and Vanuatu, aid appears to closely track imports and spending. In the other 
countries, however, the patterns are more mixed. In some years, large aid changes seem to coincide with 
commensurate changes in imports or spending, but in many cases they do not. In Gambia, for example, 
we see large changes in imports and spending that are not associated with significant changes in aid. In 
Guinea-Bissau, large aid changes in the late 1980s and 1990s often exceed changes in imports and 
spending, suggesting that it is either very difficult or undesirable (or both) to absorb and spend massive 
shocks.  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
While the graphical results are interesting, and allow us to look at country-specific results, they do not 
provide a rigorous tool for examining and formally testing more complex dynamic patterns in the data. 
The more formal econometric model we propose in Section 3 seeks to fill this gap. As we explain in 
Section 3, the autoregressive parameters of the VAR model are reduced form parameters with no direct 
interpretation; this is why we do not present or discuss the autoregressive parameter estimates. Instead, 
we focus on the dynamic responses, represented by the estimations of aid flow, absorption, spending and 
production changes following an exogenous aid shock. 
Table 4. Dynamic responses to an aid shock: Average aid flow, absorption, spending, and 
production for the 13 aid-dependent countries 
Year Aid  flow  Absorption  Spending  Production 
0 100.00  1.10  4.70  3.70 
 --  (5.50)  (6.00)  (2.70) 
1  56.80  14.20 11.80  -2.30 
  (4.00)  (11.60) (13.20)  (6.00) 
2  47.00  7.50 28.20  20.70 
  (4.50)  (14.60) (16.20)  (8.20) 
3  60.30 39.40  48.10  8.70 
  (4.40) (11.10)  (11.60) (7.70) 
4  51.90  16.90  31.70  14.80 
  (3.20)  (10.50)  (10.10)  (9.50) 
5  56.90  12.10  30.90 18.80 
  (2.90)  (9.30)  (8.90) (8.90) 
6  54.50  19.40  23.60  4.30 
  (3.20)  (10.80)  (10.40)  (9.60) 
7  57.30  14.90  25.00  10.20 
  (2.80)  (10.40)  (10.00)  (9.10) 
8  55.80  19.00  35.60  16.60 
  (3.00)  (10.90)  (10.20)  (9.60) 
Note: The response parameters and their standard errors (reported in parentheses) are estimated using Monte Carlo Integration 
based on 10,000 Monte Carlo draws (see Sims and Zha, 1999). Coefficients significant at the 5% level or better are bolded and 
italicized. 
Table 4 shows the estimated average responses for the aid-dependent country group following a 
shock in year zeo.
21 Notably, the table shows that shocks to aid are followed by significantly decreased 
aid flows in succeeding years. This confirms the high volatility of aid flows, and is consistent with 
previous findings, suggesting that policymakers in aid-receiving countries should not regard sudden 
increases in aid flows as permanent (Heller and Gupta 2002; Foster and Killick 2006; Berg et al. 2007). 
More specifically, the information in Table 4 indicates that about half of the initial change is transitory. 
As discussed in Section 2, a reasonable response to this reversion tendency in aid flows would be to delay 
and smooth the absorption and spending of sudden changes in aid. 
A certain delay or smoothing of the response is clear from Table 4, as we see only small, non-
significant changes in both absorption and spending in the initial year of the shock, and also in the first 
year thereafter. Spending increases rather smoothly from a low level in the initial year to a peak three 
                                                      
21 When reporting results for the impulse response parameters, we follow the suggestions of Sims and Zha (1999) and report 
parameter estimates and standard errors based on a Bayesian model formulation in which we condition on the initial observations 
and use a flat prior. The posterior probability distribution is estimated using Monte Carlo Integration based on 10,000 Monte 
Carlo draws.    
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years after the shock. The point estimate of the peak level of spending is 48 per cent, indicating that about 
half of the change in aid is spent. While we cannot reject the possibility of higher levels of spending, full 
spending of the additional aid flow is highly unlikely, as it is clearly outside the two-standard-error band. 
The absorption ratios are smaller than the spending ratios, but only by a small margin, and the time 
patterns are fairly similar. The peak level of absorption is also seen in year three following the shock, 
although the point estimate of the peak is only 40 per cent, yielding a relatively small effect on GDP.  
Table 4 paints a clear picture of aid shock smoothing and somewhat low absorption and spending 
ratios compared to the ideal absorption and spending prescription. However, absorption and spending 
rates just below 50 per cent are higher than the findings for most of the countries examined in Berg et al. 
(2007) and Foster and Killick (2006). Furthermore, the time pattern of absorption and spending indicates 
reasonably consistent monetary and fiscal policies in the aid-dependent countries, thereby avoiding severe 
macroeconomic imbalances that could be caused by the increased aid inflow. 
Table 5.Dynamic responses to an aid shock: Average aid flow, absorption, spending, and 
production for the seven non-aid-dependent countries 
Year Aid  flow  Absorption  Spending  Production 
0 100.00  15.80  21.00  5.20 
  -- (22.90) (24.20)  (15.50) 
1  56.90  -95.60 72.10  167.70 
  (9.60)  (67.40) (74.00)  (55.50) 
2  39.60  35.30 91.30  56.00 
  (11.10)  (157.30) (206.90)  (227.20) 
3  57.30  -38.50 49.90  88.40 
  (10.50)  (84.00) (103.70)  (67.50) 
4  41.40  -92.80 98.10  190.90 
  (7.80)  (103.60) (123.80)  (79.40) 
5  55.90  -45.70 30.40  76.10 
  (6.90)  (66.90) (80.70)  (48.60) 
6  51.80  -70.90 58.60  129.50 
  (8.10)  (74.70) (84.20)  (56.90) 
7  43.10  -51.80 81.40  133.20 
  (7.40)  (89.40) (101.10)  (68.40) 
8  53.20  -40.00 46.60  86.50 
  (6.90)  (70.20) (81.50)  (55.30) 
Note: The response parameters and their standard errors (reported in parentheses) are estimated using Monte Carlo Integration 
based on 10,000 Monte Carlo draws (see Sims and Zha, 1999). Coefficients significant at the 5% level or better are bolded and 
italicized. 
Table 5 shows the same breakdown for the seven non-aid-dependent countries. Comparison of 
Tables 4 and 5 clearly reveals that while the aid-dependent countries absorb and spend half of a sudden 
increase in aid, the non-aid-dependent countries do not absorb the change at all. However, although we 
consistently find positive spending and (mainly) negative absorption in non-aid-dependent countries, 
yielding a huge impact on production (the aid-production ratio is just below 200 per cent at its peak in 
year four after the shock), the precision in the estimates is extremely low for this group of countries. 
Given the very small sample size, the results in Table 5 should be interpreted with more than the usual 
caution. The main conclusion we can draw from our analysis of the seven non-aid-dependent countries is 
that responses to sudden changes in aid do not appear to be very systematic, either within or across these 
countries.   
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6. CONCLUSION 
We herein develop a simple vector autoregressive (VAR) model to describe the short-run macroeconomic 
responses to sudden aid shocks in SDCs. Using the notions of absorption and spending introduced to the 
aid literature by the IMF (2005; later published in a revised version as Berg et al., 2007) we describe how 
this idea of absorbing and spending aid can be extended to macroeconomic variables, where it describes 
changes in net imports and domestic demand relative to changes in aid flow. We believe that this 
conceptual expansion is particularly interesting because absorption and spending are then naturally related 
to the national income accounts identity and, hence, to GDP.  
We stress the importance of allowing for a flexible dynamic structure when modeling absorption 
and spending, because the observed volatility of aid flows necessitates a certain degree of prudence in the 
absorption and spending decisions in recipient countries. This leads us to consider a VAR model as the 
least restrictive empirical framework. In addition, when we estimate average absorption and spending 
rates across a group of SDCs, we use the mean group estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995) to allow for 
country-specific heterogeneity in the VAR model parameters. We consider such a flexible parametric 
approach to be necessary when looking at short-run changes in macroeconomic variables across countries. 
While the novelty of the present econometric analysis—as well as justified concerns over data 
quality—warrants considerable caution in interpretation and warns against drawing overly strong 
inferences, our results suggest some reasonably clear conclusions. Specifically, for aid-dependent 
countries, we can reject several of the proposed hypotheses. The first hypothesis was that sudden changes 
in aid are permanent. On the contrary, we find that aid flows to SDCs are mean reverting and, in addition, 
highly volatile. This reemphasizes the importance of ‘aid smoothing’ in aid-dependent countries, and 
allows us to be somewhat encouraged when we see that the aid-dependent countries typically appear to do 
this. Our second and third hypotheses were that aid flows are neither absorbed nor spent. Again, we are 
inclined to reject these hypotheses, because we find a reasonably strong co-movement in absorption and 
spending for the group of aid-dependent SDCs, which in turn implies that there is little short-run 
(demand-driven) impact of aid shocks on GDP (as expected). This is in contrast to the findings from the 
country studies reported in Berg et al. (2007) and Foster and Killick (2006), and also counters the findings 
of the only other econometric study of this kind that we know of (Aiyar and Ruthbah 2008). Aiyer and 
Ruthbah find that spending significantly exceeds absorption in both the short and long runs in a large 
cross-section of countries. It is unclear what can be inferred from these differences, as both the data and 
empirical methods differ between this prior study and the present work. However, we note that our results 
for the non-aid-dependent sample are much weaker than those for the aid-dependent sample, so much so 
that the non-aid-dependent results are more in line with the findings of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008).  
While we do not think these results are entirely surprising given the large aid inflows in aid-
dependent SDCs, the results do provide encouraging information to donors. For example, when aid flows 
to an economy are an important source of resources, there does appear to be sufficient focus on absorbing 
the resource flow. In contrast, when other resource flows are more important than aid (e.g. exports of 
natural resources or financial services), then aid flows may be primarily used to augment foreign 
exchange reserves. This in turn can lead to a possible mismatch between absorption and spending, 
whereby large increases in aid may lead to short-run problems and macroeconomic imbalances.  
Since our approach is methodologically novel, it behooves us to consider the implications of our 
work for future research. Such analyses could include further experiments with the econometric modeling 
of short-run responses. Although the VAR approach is largely atheoretical or ‘agnostic,’ we are required 
to impose restrictions on the causal ordering of the variables in the VAR-model without formal theoretical 
guidance. Arguably, the key assumption of this ordering is that changes in aid, conditional on the past, are 
predetermined with respect to the other variables. This assumption can be challenged. For example, in 
very small economies that are highly dependent on imports, donors may react to any factor that threatens 
the import capacity of the country (e.g., export shocks or terms of trade shocks, such as the recent surge in 
international food prices). There are also different ways in which one might define subsamples or average  
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across them, and future investigations in this area would do well to identify the robustness of alternative 
means of grouping responses. Nevertheless, the use of VAR-type models in the context of aid flows 
seems as though it will be a useful avenue for improving our understanding of both how aid is actually 
utilized in the short run, and how its utilization might be improved.  
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